

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 015724  
ORIGIN AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 HA-05 TRSE-00  
ACDA-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00  
USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 PA-01  
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 /098 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:GSCOTT:AB

APPROVED BY AF:WHARROP

-----072186 200253Z /13

O R 200135Z JAN 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 015724

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, ET, US, UR, MOPS, PDEV

SUBJECT:CALL BY SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU ON ACTING ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY WILLIAM HARROP

1. THE SOMALI AMBASSADOR REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT AND WAS  
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RECEIVED BY ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM HARROP ON  
JANUARY 17.

2. ADDOU BEGAN BY REMINDING MR. HARROP OF PRESIDENT SIAD'S  
RECENT MEETING WITH THE US CHARGE AND REPRESENTATIVES OF  
GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY AND ITALY IN WHICH SIAD  
ALERTED THEM TO AN IMMINENT LAND AND SEA INVASION OF

SOMALIA AND ASKED THEM TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCES. ADDOU HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RECONFIRM TO THE DEPARTMENT THE SOMALI BELIEF THAT SUCH AN OFFENSIVE WAS IMMINENT.

3. ADDOU HAD ALSO BEEN ASKED TO SEEK ELUCIDATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT ON JANUARY 12 IN WHICH HE SUGGESTED THAT SOMALIA CALL PUBLICLY FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AND NOTED A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ADDOU CONFIRMED SOMALIA'S WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AT PEACE TALKS, BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED HOW PRESIDENT CARTER'S IDEA OF SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT. MR. HARROP REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S REMARKS UNDERLINED THE US BELIEF THAT A NEGOTIATED

SOLUTION WAS THE ONLY REAL SOLUTION POSSIBLE TO THE OGADEN CONFLICT. THE PRESIDENT HAD MENTIONED THE UNITED NATIONS, BUT NOT AS PART OF A SPECIFIC PROJECT. WE SUPPORTED OAU MEDIATION BUT RULED OUT NO AVENUE TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HARROP NOTED THAT WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY PRESIDENT SIAD'S RECENT STATEMENT OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE ETHIOPIANS AND ASKED IF WE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THAT SOMALIA WAS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS SUCH AS THE PARTICIPATION OF THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT. AMBASSADOR ADDOU REPLIED THAT THE SOMALIS WERE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS AND WOULD GO ANYWHERE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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EXCEPTION OF MOSCOW OR ADDIS ABABA.

4. ADDOU INSISTED THAT THE INTRA-AFRICAN NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN THE HORN WAS OVERSHADOWED BY THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC OF THE ABILITY OF THE MENGISTU REGIME TO PUT FORWARD ITS OWN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM APART FROM THE ONE ADVOCATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT HAD INFORMED THE OAU CHAIRMAN OF THE FACT THAT FOREIGN FORCES WERE A DANGER TO SOMALIA. MR. HARROP ASKED ADDOU WHAT THE POSSIBLE OUTLINE OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION MIGHT BE, NOTING THAT PRESUMABLY THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD NOT WANT A SOLUTION IN WHICH SOMALIA OCCUPIED ETHIOPIAN TERRITORY. ADDOU SAID THAT THE SOMALIS ENVISIONED A CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSIONS OF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA AND THE OGADEN PROBLEM. THE KEY TO PEACE WAS TO ASK WHAT THE CONCERNED PEOPLE WISHED. A SOLUTION MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OGADENI INHABITANTS.

5 HARROP EMPHASIZED THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SEEK TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AS A MEDIATOR. WE WISHED TO AVOID A SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION, FROM WHICH CAME OUR

POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING ARMS TO EITHER SIDE. ADDOU REPLIED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WOULD BE TO RETREAT, AND THAT THE POLICY OF NOT PROVIDING ARMS TO EITHER SIDE REALLY MEANT NOT PROVIDING ARMS TO SOMALIA SINCE ETHIOPIA, NOW HAVING ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF SOVIET ARMS, WOULD NOT TAKE AMERICAN ARMS IN ANY CASE. ADDOU SAID THAT WITH THE SOVIET AND

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, THE CONFLICT WAS NO LONGER ONE BETWEEN AFRICAN NATIONS. THE REFUSAL OF THE AMERICANS TO PLAY THE PROPER ROLE WOULD LEAD NOT TO COMPLIMENTS ON OUR SELF-RESTRAINT, BUT TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE SIMPLY AFRAID OF ENGAGING THE SOVIETS.

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6. ALTHOUGH UNINSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT, ADDOU WISHED TO RAISE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT CONSIDER TRAINING SOMALI MILITARY IN THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT SO THAT WHEN THE TIME CAME THAT WE OR OUR ALLIES COULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, SOMALI CADRE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE USE OF THE MATERIEL OFFERED. HE ASKED MR. HARROP NOT TO REPLY IMMEDIATELY, BUT TO THINK OF THIS AS A POSSIBLE OPTION. MR. HARROP REPLIED THAT THE SOMALIS HAD EARLIER PROPOSED THAT WE DESIGNATE ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AGAINST THE TIME WHEN WE WERE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT OUR DECISION IN PRINCIPLE. WE HAD CONSIDERED THAT PROPOSAL, BUT INFORMED THE SOMALIS THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE CONSIDERED A MOVE TOWARDS MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND WE COULD NOT UNDERTAKE SUCH A PROGRAM WHILE THE CONFLICT IN THE OGADEN CONTINUED. FOR THE SAME REASON HE DID NOT BELIEVE A PROPOSAL TO TRAIN SOMALIS IN THE USE OF AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME WAS FEASIBLE. NOR WAS PRESIDENT SIAD'S REQUEST FOR AMERICAN TROOPS A PROPOSAL WE COULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER.

7. MR. HARROP ASKED WHAT THE SOMALIS HAD DONE TO REASSURE THE KENYANS. ADDOU REPLIED THAT THE KENYANS HAD BEEN OFFERED A TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BUT HAD NOT BEEN SATISFIED WITH THAT. IT WAS THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NOT SIMPLY ONE OF PLEDGING NOT TO INVADE KENYA. THE KENYANS ALSO FEARED SOMALI POLITICAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF AND THE PROVISION OF COVERT SUPPORT FOR KENYAN-SOMALI MOVES FOR INDEPENDENCE. PRESIDENT SIAD HAD NEVER RENOUNCED ANY INTENTION OF PROVIDING SUCH SUPPORT. ADDOU REPLIED THAT SIAD AS A SOMALI POLITICIAN COULD NOT MAKE SUCH A PUBLIC RENUNCIATION. NO SOMALI COULD SAY HE WOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY THE TREATMENT OF OR THE DEMANDS OF FELLOW SOMALIS. BUT THE SOMALIS WERE WILLING TO SAY THAT

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THEY COULD NOT ENVISION SUCH A SITUATION COMING TO PASS.  
THEY WOULD DO NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE SUCH AN ATTITUDE ON  
THE PART OF THE KENYAN SOMALIS, AND IF SUCH AN ATTITUDE

DISCOURAGE IT. IN THE SOMALI VIEW, A TREATY OF FRIEND-  
SHIP, COOPERATION AND NON-AGGRESSION WOULD PRECLUDE ANY  
ACTION AGAINST KENYA. MR. HARROP SAID HE BELIEVED SUCH A  
TREATY WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP. CHRISTOPHER

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /013 R

66011  
DRAFTED BY:EUR/CE:VGRAY:DHT  
APPROVED BY:EUR/CE:WWOESSNER  
-----114868 241355Z /50

R 240550Z JAN 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 015724

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 015724 SENT ACTION MOGADISCIO INFO  
ADDIS ABABA BONN ROME PARIS LONDON NAIROBI KHARTOUM CAIRO  
JIDDA TEHRAN SANA DJIBOUTI USUN NEW YORK JAN 20.  
QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 015724

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, ET, US, UR, MOPS, PDEV

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Concepts:** AMBASSADORS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
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**Draft Date:** 20 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
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**Subject:** CALL BY SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU ON ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM HARROP  
**TAGS:** MOPS, PDEV, SO, ET, US, UR  
**To:** MOGADISCIO  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
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